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There is currently much interest in scenario-focused decision analysis (sfda), a methodology which pro-
vides, among other things, supporting analyses in circumstances in which there are deep uncertainties about
the future, i.e. when experts and decision makers (dms) cannot come to any agreement on some of the
probabilities to use in a Bayesian model. This lack of agreement can mean that sensitivity and robustness
analyses show that virtually any strategy may be optimal under the beliefs of one or more participants.
Scenario-focused analyses fix the deep uncertainties at interesting values in different scenarios and conduct a
(Bayesian) decision analysis within each. The results can be informative to the dms, helping them understand
different possible futures and their reactions to them. However, theoretical axiomatisations of subjective
expected utility (seu), the core of decision analysis, do not immediately extend to the context of sfda. The
purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatisation of seu that supports sfda. Scenarios have much in
common with Savage’s concept of a small worlds. We discuss the parallels and then explore two difficulties
in extending his and other writers’ axiomatisations. The development of seu offered here overcomes these
difficulties. Throughout attention is given to the implications of the theoretical development for the practice
of decision analysis.
Key words : deep uncertainty, small world, reference experiment, scenario-focused decision analysis (sfda),
subjective expected utility (seu)
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1. Introduction
“With some inaccuracy, descriptions of uncertain consequences can be classified into
two major categories, those which use exclusively the language of probability distribu-
tions and those which call for some other principle, either to replace or to supplement.”
K.J. Arrow, 1951
Many Bayesians would argue that no further tools are needed to model uncertainty than
subjective probability; some might concede that there is value in a careful and judicious use
of sensitivity and robustness analyses along with thoughtful discussion to clarify conceptual
vagueness: see French (1995, 2003). However, many non-Bayesian writers have pointed
to circumstances in which some uncertainties about future events are too deep to agree
on probabilities; some effectively deny the conceptual existence of probabilities for such
events. Knight (1921) argued for a distinction between circumstances of risk in which
probabilities could be agreed and those of uncertainty in which they could not. Discussions
of such issues may be found in the literature centred around decision tables and criteria
such as minimax, maximim regret and Hurwicz−α (Luce and Raiffa 1957, French 1986).
During the last century, such circumstances were described as exhibiting strict uncertainty;
nowadays, the term deep uncertainty is more common. For more recent perspectives on
deep uncertainty, see Lempert et al (2003), Spiegelhalter and Riesch (2011), Cox (2012),
Durbach and Stewart (2012) and Marchau et al (2019).
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I shall not adopt Knight’s position. Conceptually, I adopt a fully subjective Bayesian
stance and believe all uncertainties can in principle be expressed probabilistically. However,
in practice it may not be possible in the time available before the results of any analysis
are required. Warren Walker, who has led thinking in this area for the past two decades,
defines deep uncertainty as “the condition in which analysts do not know or the parties to
a decision cannot agree upon (1) the appropriate models to describe interactions among
a system’s variables (2) the probability distributions to represent uncertainty about key
parameter’s in the model, and/or (3) how to value the desirability of alternative outcomes”
(Walker et al 2013). Such lack of agreement may be resolved by further research studies
and discussion, but that takes time. This definition of deep uncertainty gives a modern
interpretation of Knight’s perspective; and, indeed, of Arrow’s as embodied in the opening
quote. It recognises that our knowledge evolves over time, but perhaps not quickly enough
for the decisions that are needed today. For further discussion, see French (2013, 2015),
in which I discuss the many of the issues that motivated this work and my perspectives
on uncertainty and its modelling in risk and decision analysis.
In such circumstances, scenario planning has often helped (Schoemaker 1995). Recently,
various authors have discussed how more quantitative forms of analysis may be com-
bined with scenario planning (Stewart et al 2013, Wright and Goodwin 1999), leading
to scenario-focused decision analysis (sfda). The aim, in part, has been to address deep
uncertainties through ’fixing’ these in particular scenarios, so that conventional analyses
may be conducted within each. By comparing the results across scenarios some under-
standing may be garnered of the robustness of strategies. French (2013, 2015) provides
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some further motivation for the merging of scenario thinking with more conventional deci-
sion analyses. There have been several studies which use multiple scenarios to conduct
parallel quantitative multi-criteria decision analyses (Montibeller et al 2006, Ram et al
2011, Schroeder and Lambert 2011, Comes et al 2013). In all cases, the actual analyses
within scenarios were deterministic using multi-attribute value theory. French et al (2011)
provides an unpublished study in which decision tree analysis is used in each scenario to
evaluate the sustainability of nuclear energy in the UK; we discuss parts of this study
below. Williamson and Goldstein (2012) indicate that their emulation methods for large
complex decision trees can be integrated with scenario planning. As I write this, the UK is
mired in Brexit planning and negotiations, in preparation for leaving the European Union.
Deliberations abound with half-defined, contradictory and often counterfactual assump-
tions. Many uncertainties face us. Many stakeholders hold quite different values. sfda has
the potential to clarify issues and differences, enlightening the debate.
Intuitively, the methodology of sfda seems sensible and straightforward. There are sig-
nificant questions relating to cognitive aspects: e.g. how to elicit subjective probabilities
and utilities within the context of a scenario and how to draw the fullest possible informa-
tion from the results without naively making implicit, but unfounded assumptions about
the relative likelihood of scenarios. But mathematically the process looks sound. On deeper
consideration (French 2015), however, there are some fundamental issues that require
discussion and attention. As Savage (1972) noted, any Bayesian model describes a small
world. There have been many axiomatisations of the Bayesian model, but these generally
have taken the concept of a small world from Savage without great discussion (Laskey and
Lehner 1994). Small worlds and scenarios have many similarities: the former provide a
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setting for a statistical or decision analysis; the latter a backdrop for qualitative strategic
debate in scenario planning. Nonetheless, there are differences. In scenario planning, sev-
eral scenarios are used. These might or might not overlap. Bayesian analyses are usually
set in a single small world. Savage did consider the use of several small worlds, but as a
nested sequence leading up to the ‘full’ grand world, which he essentially took as being
conceptually as close to reality as one can get with a model.
Two issues arise because of the differences between small worlds and scenarios.
1. To measure subjective probabilities and utilities, we need something like a metre rule
with gradations that are, at least conceptually, as fine as we need them to be. In prac-
tice, we might use a probability wheel or similar, and there are many examples of using
such elicitation tools in introductory decision analysis texts (French et al 2009, Reilly
and Clemen 2013). This is conceptualised as a reference or auxiliary experiment, which
essentially provides a uniform probability distribution against which uncertainties relat-
ing to the events and consequences of interest may be compared and measured (French
et al 2009, pp72-73). In Savage’s and other axiomatisations, this reference experiment
is common to all small worlds in the nested sequence, ensuring that probability and
utility are measured on common consistent scales. In sfda the scenarios are not nested.
2. In standard Bayesian subjective expected utility (seu) theory, reality is taken to act as
an attractor so that, with sufficient data, behaviours in the small worlds converge to
models of real behaviours. Some scenarios, however, may describe worlds quite differ-
ent, possibly dramatically different from the future that actually unfolds. Indeed they
may be conceptually or practically impossible on current knowledge, i.e. counterfactual.
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Analyses within such scenarios cannot describe nor converge to Savage’s grand world,
yet may be very informative to the decision makers’ (dms’) deliberations. For example,
in an environmental impact study Rothlisberger et al (2012) needed to assess what the
likelihoods of different ecologies of an infested lake would have been, if no infestation
had taken place.
Thus there is a need to consider the validity and good sense of the Bayesian approach
with sfda. To address these issues, I argue, that we need to separate the reference experi-
ment from the field or σ−field of events that describe possible outcomes in the small world.
If our modelling requires only a finite set of events and finite additivity, then the former
is all that is needed. But if we need a larger set of events, the full power of continuous
random variables and integration to evaluate expectations, then we need the real world
events to form a σ−field (French and Rios Insua 2000). We return to this point in Section
4. This separation of the real world from the reference experiment leads to more complex
and less mathematically attractive axiomatisations of Bayesian theory, but ones that are
both more fit for purpose and also align better with the constructive nature of Bayesian
analysis1.
The focus of this paper is on providing a theoretical justification of sfda and considering
the implications of this for the meaningfulness of some potential comparisons between
scenarios. We do not consider in any depth cognitive issues relating to elicitation and the
transparency of the process. Nor do we consider any implications of the development for
Bayesian statistics, which, of course, relies on the same seu model.
In the next section, we consider an example of sfda to motivate the developments that
follow. In particular, we emphasise the need to develop seu theory to fit with scenarios
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that not only may differ substantially in context, but also in terms of the beliefs and values
that the dm wishes to explore. Our discussion in Section 3 turns to the small worlds which
model the scenarios, offering the quantitative context in which Bayesian seu analyses can
take place. As noted in point 1, if analyses in different scenarios, i.e. parallel small worlds,
are to be commensurate to some level, judgements need to be assessed against the same
reference experiment. Separating the reference experiment from the small worlds of concern
is the tool that allows us to develop seu theory for sfda. We axiomatise seu theory
across parallel small worlds with a common reference experiment in Section 4, providing
consistent scales of probability across them all, thus meeting point 1 above. Outline proofs
are provided an Appendix, though very similar proofs have been published elsewhere, e.g.
French and Rios Insua (2000). The constructive nature of the proofs illustrates many of the
more discursive points made in the paper. In Section 5 we extend the example of Section
2 and use this to give substance to the discussion of the implications of the theoretical
development for the practice of sfda. We also note that in addition to the theoretical
foundation provided, further work is needed on many cognitive issues. Finally, Section 7
offers some brief concluding remarks.
2. Nuclear sustainability: an example of SFDA
Many developments of decision analysis have found early application in support of decision
making in the nuclear domain (Keeney and Nair 1977). Post-Chernobyl there have been
many applications in emergency planning and remedial clean-up (Papamichail and French
2013). The disposal of nuclear waste is another area which has seen much application
(Keeney and von Winterfeldt 1994, Morton et al 2009)
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Some time back — before the Fukushima Disaster — I was involved in a multi-
disciplinary project to consider the sustainability of nuclear power generation with the UK
energy portfolio (French et al 2011). Sustainability was to be interpreted in a very broad
fashion including economic, environmental, security and safety criteria and was to be con-
sidered from the differing perspectives of a wide variety of stakeholders. Furthermore, our
time horizon was essentially 60+ years because of the long build-operate-decommission life
cycle of a nuclear reactor. Over such periods there were many uncertainties to consider
and some were deep. For instance, the economic viability of nuclear and renewable gen-
eration related to whether some form of energy storage could be developed to match the
slowly adjustable output of nuclear plants and the vagaries of most renewables smoothly
to relatively fast changing energy demand. The development of large scale energy storage
and the date by which it might come on stream were deeply uncertain and subject to
much disagreement. We could examine, however, ‘interesting’ scenarios in which economic
storage became available at different dates. The viability of any energy portfolio would also
be determined by government policy. Again ‘interesting’ scenarios could be established in
which different policies were assumed. Public and hence political acceptability of nuclear
power could be affected by a future nuclear accident, and indeed the Fukushima Disaster
has led to gross changes in commitments to nuclear energy in many countries. Again many
deep uncertainties about such accidents could be explored through different scenarios.
These motivations for exploring differing scenarios relate to deep uncertainties, the
belief/probability side of the Bayesian paradigm. But there is also a preference/utility side,
and scenarios can elucidate some of the issues there. Debates about nuclear power have
been riven by many opposing stakeholder perspectives. If decision analyses are to support
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discussion between different stakeholder groups at least some of the analyses need to reflect
each group’s values. The idea is to explore what the future would look like if each group’s
values dominated in the decisions and behaviours that shape it. Conducting a decision
analysis against such scenarios enables each group to see not only how the various energy
policies might perform in their own ideal world, but also how they might perform in other
stakeholders’ ideal worlds.
Sometimes an event can catalyse radical changes in a decision maker’s (dm’s) beliefs and
preferences (French et al 1997). If an event changes the world irrevocably, she2 may need
to rethink her perspectives, beliefs and values. Moreover, if she recognises the possibility
of such an event, then she may be able to anticipate how her judgements might change. In
French (2013), I argue that it is only when we have experienced a phenomenon many times
that we understand our beliefs and preferences about it. An unanticipated novel event can
catalyse a step change in scientific knowledge, even a paradigm shift. Similarly, when we
encounter some entirely novel circumstances, we need to evolve our preferences to those
circumstances in order to determine what we really want. The near disaster at Three Mile
Island (tmi) in 1979 led to new understandings of how hydrogen bubbles might form in a
reactor vessel, and hence had significant implications for reactor design. On the value side,
tmi catalysed both individuals and society to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of nuclear
power. Because such events are so novel, so complex, one cannot build ‘rational’ models
anticipating how beliefs and preferences will evolve. There is no simple a priori application
of Bayes Theorem to anticipate a paradigm shift in unanticipated circumstances, though
with hindsight one might tell a simplistic story along those lines. Nor can one apply models
of preference evolution. It has become common over the past 25 years to use qualitative
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scenario planning to stimulate decision makers to imagine dramatically different futures
and their responses to these. Working within each scenario it is possible in many cases for
the dm’s to anticipate how their beliefs and preferences might evolve.
This example illustrates three important features that need be allowed for in developing
an axiomatisation of the seu model that justifies its use in sfda:
• deep uncertainties may be fixed in a scenario allowing probability models to be con-
structed which reflect current knowledge as it would play out in those circumstances;
• a particular stakeholder’s values may be explored in a scenario, allowing the dm to
explore differing stakeholder perspectives across scenarios;
• gross changes in the dm’s beliefs and preferences caused by a dramatic – paradigmatic
or catastrophic – change in the her world and environment may be anticipated and
explored.
3. Small worlds and Bayesian SEU theory
Most seu models are built upon a mathematical structure with three components,
{Θ,C,A}, where:
Θ = {θ | θ is a state of the world} is the state space; (1)
C = {c | c is a consequence} is the consequence space; (2)
A= {a | a is an act which the dm can choose} is the action space. (3)
A state of the world is a possible description of the present and future with all uncertainties
resolved, Θ being taken to span all possibilities. However great her uncertainty, the dm is
certain that one of the descriptions in Θ is true. The set of consequences C contains all
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possible outcomes that may arise from her acts a ∈A. Each act relates outcomes to each
possible state of the world so we might also define A as:
A= {a | a : θ→C}. (4)
For the present we shall define A no further and take it to contain all acts that the dm
wishes to consider.
The triple {Θ,C,A} is effectively what Savage (1972) dubbed a small world. The inter-
pretations of {Θ,C,A} make a host of implausible assumptions about our knowledge of
reality and, indeed, ourselves: e.g. that we can anticipate the future well enough that Θ
spans all possibilities. Our purpose in this paper is to develop an axiomatisation that allows
some weakening of such assumptions in the direction of greater realism. But first we step
back from detail to consider wider issues of the interpretation of a small world, something
that concerned Savage deeply and which he did not resolve entirely to his own satisfaction.
Savage’s approach (§5.5, Savage (1972)) was to consider a nested sequence of small worlds
increasing in complexity and detail up to a grand world, which was essentially reality or
as close as he could get to it. He discussed the consistency needed between assumptions
about behaviours in one small world and the next in order that each might become a better
approximation to the grand world, noting, for instance, that a smaller world state needs
to be an event in a larger world that contains it. Savage recognised that the detail and
complexity of the grand world would be so great that the nested sequence would never
reach it. He found it “difficult to say with any completeness” the form that the process of
constructing the sequence would take. Phillips (1984) in his theory of requisite modelling
elaborated on the the process somewhat. The key point in Savage’s conception was that, as
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one proceeded up the sequence through cycles of model evaluation and criticism towards
the grand world, each small world would get closer in structure to reality and that, with
sufficient data, behaviours predicted by Bayesian models built in the small worlds would
converge in some very informal sense to behaviours in reality. That conception is central
to many Bayesian discussions of scientific inference; see, e.g., Box (1980). In short, there
is an assumption that as observations accumulate, reality attracts good Bayesian models.
At least, that assumption underpins much of Bayesian statistics: whether it underpins
Bayesian decision analysis we leave to the discussion in Section 5.
There are many axiomatic developments of the seu model. French and Rios Insua (2000)
provide a survey of several, classifying them broadly into two categories:
• Revealed preference approaches: these essentially define and axiomatise properties
that might be expected of a rational dm’s preferences over the action space. With the
addition of some structural axioms, it can then shown that her preferences over A may
be modelled by seu based on a subjective probability distribution over Θ and a utility
function over C. Note that the dm’s preferences over A are the primitive judgements
and from these her beliefs about the relative likelihood of different states in Θ and
her preferences over C are deduced, i.e. revealed. There are many such approaches, but
perhaps the best known and most cited is that of Savage (1972).
• Constructive approaches: these define and axiomatise properties that might be
expect of a rational dm’s beliefs about the the relative likelihood of states in Θ and
her preferences between possible consequences in C and from these construct her pref-
erences between actions in A, showing that these may be modelled by expected utilities.
DeGroot (1970) provides an archetypal constructive development of the seu model.
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I have always found constructive approaches more persuasive. While, to quote Locke,
to others “men’s actions are the best interpreters of their thoughts”, to guide my own
thinking, inference and decision making I want a form of analysis that begins with my
uncertainties about the world and my preferences between possible future consequences
and moves me towards an understanding of the relative advantages of different actions
and, indeed, a ranking of them that can guide my choice. As an analyst, I have found
that my clients wish for the same. Moreover, the mathematical proofs that constructive
axiomatisations lead to the seu model also mirror the elicitation processes commonly used
by analysts to help dms construct a consistent model of their beliefs and preferences (French
et al 2009, Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Slovic 1995). Constructive approaches provide
transparent justifications of the arguments implicit in an analysis. Revealed preferences
lack that transparency. In mathematical terms, of course, they are equivalent since they
axiomatise and justify identical results. Nonetheless, the majority of discussion in this
paper concerns a constructive development that justifies the use of seu in sfda.
I also need a constructive approach because much as I would like to be an instinctive
Bayesian, I doubt very much that I am. Too many behavioural studies have have shown
that humans are not as rational in their inference and decision making as they would wish
(Kahneman and Tversky 1974, French et al 2009); I am unlikely to be an exception. Nor
are my clients. Having described this fallability somewhat pejoratively as being subject to
heuristics and biases, Kahneman (2011) and others now refer to two style of thinking. In
broad terms – these are not offered as precise definitions:
• System 1 thinking is somewhat superficial, takes place on the fringes or outside of
consciousness and is subject to heuristics and biases;
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• System 2 thinking is more conscious, more analytic, more careful and usually sup-
ported by models articulated within explicit arguments to justify the final inference or
decision.
The precise definitions of System 1 and System 2 Thinking are moot within the behavioural
sciences, as is the terminology. Shleifer (2012), Evans and Stanovich (2013) and Evans
(2012) discuss the controversy. Whatever the terminology, decision analysis has long recog-
nised that instinctive responses and behaviours might not reflect the rationality and consis-
tency that careful, conscious thought might wish. I shall follow Kahneman (2011) in using
the non-pejorative System 1 vs System 2 Thinking terminology. Moreover, I also recognise
that there may not be a true dichotomy here, but increasing depth between subconscious
informal thought and conscious explicit formal thought. For behavioural scientists System
2 Thinking need only be conscious, explicit and analytic; there is no presumption that it is
rational in any particular sense. However, Bayesian decision analysis seeks to help the dm
adopt Bayesian ways of thought, guiding her away from the foibles of System 1 Thinking.
An analyst has to communicate with and support clients who intuitively think, respond
and understand using System 1 styles of thought; yet he must develop an analysis using
fully explicit System 2 styles of thinking to support and help build their individual under-
standing and group consensus (Edwards et al 2007, French 2003, 2013, 2015, French et al
2009). Even when I am conducting an analysis for myself, there is a need to recognise that
my thought processes will inevitably move between Systems 1 and 2 styles of thinking as
I move from framing the issues through analysis to inferring, deciding and implementing.
From my perspective, the Bayesian seu model fits in this process by providing a model
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of rational behaviour rather than a model of how I actually am. In French (1986), I sug-
gested that the processes of statistical and decision analysis might be thought of as the
creation of a model decision maker (mdm) in the small world in which the analysis is to be
constructed3 and exploring how she made inferences and decisions in circumstances that
modelled the real dm’s. The mdm’s beliefs and preferences should as close to the real dm’s
as possible, but constrained to be fully rational in the sense of fitting an axiomatic seu
theory. Shafer (1986) terms this process argument by analogy. By observing this inference
or decision process model, the real dm gains insight to guide her behaviour in the real
world. The Bayesian model is no more than a close metaphor for the cognitive process
that the dm should like to follow. For further discussion, see French (2015).
Axiomatisations of seu are an application of measurement theory, which is the body
of knowledge that clarifies how behaviours in a quantitative model reflect qualitative
behaviours in some system (Krantz et al 1971, Suppes et al 1989, Luce et al 1990,
Roberts 1979). Among the many insights the theory brings, it emphasises that there
must be some properties in the qualitative system that are reflected the characteristics of
the number system used in the quantitative model. Generally this insight leads us into
the theory of scale types. Specifically, since probability is central to seu theory both in
representing uncertainty and in the construction of a utility scale to represent preference,
the axiomatisation must include an assumption that introduces a 0–1 scale of probabil-
ity. In Savage’s Theory, this is essentially provided by his sixth axiom. DeGroot (1970)
explicitly assumes the existence of a uniform probability distribution in his fifth axiom.
These axioms effectively introduce a randomising device such as a probability wheel, more
formally called a reference or auxiliary experiment, against which the dm may measure
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off her uncertainties. However, these theories do so by including the events generated by
the reference experiment within the (σ−)field of events that describes the small world of
concern. In terms of measurement, this is equivalent to constructing a theory of length
in a world in which metre rules are helpfully lying alongside every object that one might
conceivably wish to measure. In practice, of course, one places a rule alongside an object
when its length is needed. So too in the practice of decision analysis, the analyst introduces
a probability wheel at those points when he needs to interact with the dm to elicit her
uncertainties and preferences.
In a series of writings, several of us have introduced axiomatisations of subjective prob-
ability and seu theory that keep the reference experiment separate from the field of events
of real concern to the dm within the small world that she is considering (French 1986,
1982, French and Rios Insua 2000, French et al 2009, Xie 1995, Xie and French 1997).
The theoretical development of this paper builds on those extending the development from
that needed for a single or nested sequence of small worlds to several parallel ones. We
refer to the earlier work extensively for further motivating discussion. For definiteness, the
axioms and notation below build on those in French and Rios Insua (2000) to develop an
axiomatisation relevant to parallel small worlds.
We note that the assumptions made in an axiom may have one or more of the following
qualities:
• Rationality, AR. Such axioms encode behaviours or judgements that should be consid-
ered rational. For instance, transitivity, which is required by PSW1 below, is commonly
accepted as a good principle of rationality. These axioms go to the heart of System 2
thinking, describing the aspects of the mdm’s behaviour that make her an ideal to whom
the real decision maker is willing to look for guidance.
Simon French: Parallel Small Worlds
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2018-05-258 17
• Measurement device, AMe. Such axioms introduce the measurement device that is
to be used to quantify the qualitative behaviours and characterise their properties, e.g.
Axiom PSW2 below introduces the reference experiment.
• Context structure, AC . Such axioms encode features that must be present in the small
world and the mdm’s judgements for any analysis to take place. For instance, Axiom
PSW3 below includes an assumption that there is some event in the small world that is
more likely than an impossibility: strictly, it assumes that certainty is more likely than
impossibility.
• Mathematical structure, AMa. Such axioms introduce properties that nice math-
ematical models need, e.g. countable additivity. It would be conceptually possible to
develop statistical, decision and risk analysis on the basis of finite additivity only; the
number of entities in the universe is finite after all. But countable additivity gives the
mathematical model much more power to explore and understand behaviour.
Categorising axioms according to whether they make rationality, context, measurement or
mathematical assumptions emphasises different aspects of building a model in analysis to
guide dms towards rational System 2 thinking. Recognising and understanding that can
help in explaining and motivating the analysis to the dms and in what ways the model
can be useful. Of course, few axioms can be categorised simply in just one of these ways.
Mathematical elegance and the drive to succinctness means that inevitably several such
qualities may be present in each axiom. We indicate for each axiom below the qualities
that pertain within it. The reason for doing this is that to address the two concerns raised
in Section 1 we should look at the measurement and contextual aspects of the axioms,
respectively.
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4. Axiomatising SEU theory across parallel small worlds with a common
reference experiment
The first step that we take is to widen our notation to cover parallel small worlds,
{Θw,Cw,Aw},w= 1,2, . . . ,W . We assume that each of the small worlds represents a set of
circumstances or futures that a dm would find informative to consider. Each might repre-
sent, for example, some realisation of a deep uncertainty, some different sets of knowledge
or cultural values. Our aim is to help her by constructing, i.e. axiomatising, in each small
world a rational mdm who faces a decision which captures the essence of the decision facing
her. For each small world we assume that the mdm begins with a qualitative feeling of rela-
tive likelihood between events defined on Θw, which we denote by the binary relation Θw ,
and with a qualitative feeling of preference between consequences in Cw which we denote by
the binary relation Cw . It will help in later sections to acknowledge that the mdm’s beliefs
and preferences are part of the conceptual small world that the real dm is considering and
from here on denote each small world, w= 1,2, . . . ,W , by {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw ,Cw}.
We follow common practice and introduce Θw , ∼Θw , Cw and ∼Cw with the following
meanings:
Θw – at least as likely as;
Θw – strictly more likely than, defined by E Θw F ⇐⇒ (E Θw F and F 6Θw E);
∼Θw – equally likely as, defined by E ∼Θw F ⇐⇒ (E Θw F and F Θw E);
Cw – at least as good as;
Cw – strictly better than, defined by c1 Cw c2⇐⇒ (c1 Cw c2 and c2 6Cw c1);
∼Cw – indifferent to, defined by c1 Cw c2⇐⇒ (c1 Cw c2 and c2 Cw c1).
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N.B. these interpretations are well defined when Θw and Cw are weak orders (French
1986), as assumed in Axioms PSW1 and PSW9 below.
In developing seu for parallel small worlds, we shall need to be clear on the interpretation
of the elements of {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw ,Cw}. Firstly, the Θw need not be related to each other
in any simple fashion; neither need the Aw nor the Cw. It may be that one starts with some
encompassing small world {Θ,C,A,Θ,C}, then constructs each of the {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw
,Cw}, perhaps by assuming that some event on Θ happens or that some a ∈A becomes
unavailable, thus forming the new small world by conditioning. However, the spirit of
scenario-planning encourages us to consider a much wider range of small worlds, which
may be quite unrelated, almost paradigmatically different. Similarly, the Θw and Cw
need not be related in any direct sense, perhaps because the mdm in each small world may
represent the beliefs and preferences of different stakeholders or because the small world
relates to the aftermath of a dramatic event that causes the dm to reflect on and change
her beliefs and values4.
For her beliefs and preferences to be assessed consistently across the parallel small
worlds, the mdm must relate all her judgements to the same reference experiment. This will
ensure that her probability assessments represent the same levels of uncertainty within all
scenarios. Without further assumptions, numerical utilities will not be comparable across
scenarios; utilities are only unique up to an affine transformation. Later we will discuss
further assumptions that may give some comparability between the utility functions.
We begin with the axioms that ensure that the mdm’s assessment of relative likelihoods
over the Θw can be modelled by probabilities. For each w= 1,2, . . . ,W , we let Qw be a field
or σ-field of events defined on Θw. To assess the probabilities of events in Qw we assume
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that the mdm compares each with events defined on some fair – or uniform – randomising
device. We represent events on this randomising device by intervals in [0,1]. For instance if
the randomising device is a probability wheel, the event that the pointer stops spinning in
a given sector would be identified with an interval of length equal to the proportion of the
full circle represented by that sector. We let B be the σ-field of open and closed intervals
on [0,1]. To be absolutely clear: we used the same B in comparisons with Qw,∀w.
First we need to assume that she is prepared to compare events in Qw with events in
B, but we do not want to do this in such a way that the minimal σ-field of all events in
both Qw and B is necessarily formed. At no point in a decision analysis is it necessary to
consider complex events and strategies involving unions and intersections of events drawn
from both; only simple comparisons are needed. Thus we extend Θw to Qw ∪B, but note
this is the set union of Qw and B not the minimal σ-field containing both. Our first axiom
demands that Θ is a weak order, i.e. complete and transitive.
Axiom PSW1 [Qualities: AR, AMe, AC ]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , Θw is a weak order on Qw ∪B.
Next we need assume that her judgements of the relative likelihood of events in B cor-
respond to a uniform distribution in the obvious way. Note that this axiom implies that
Θw , for w= 1,2, . . . ,W , are identical on B.
Axiom PSW2 [Qualities: AMe]
Let I, J be intervals, open or closed, in B with lengths `I and `J .
Then, ∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , I Θw J⇐⇒ `I ≥ `J .
In most axiomatisations of subjective probability the next assumption would be to assume
that Θw is a qualitative probability over a σ-field containing both Qw and B (French and
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Rios Insua 2000), but we want to avoid going that far. We need it to be a qualitative
probability on each of Qw and B. This is achieved by Axioms PSW3 and PSW4. However,
elicitation of her probabilities over Θw only requires that the mdm can compare events in
Qw directly with events in B, and that she does so consistently over set unions within each
of Qw and B. This requirement is encoded by Axiom PSW5.
Axiom PSW3 [Qualities: AR, AC ]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , Θw restricted to Qw is a qualitative probability.
Thus in addition to it being a weak order on Qw:
(a) ∀R ∈Qw,RΘw ∅. Moreover Θw Θw ∅.
(b) ∀R,S,T ∈Qw with R∩T = ∅= S ∩T : RΘw S⇐⇒R∪T Θw S ∪T .
Axiom PSW4 [Qualities: AR, AMe]
Θw restricted to B is a qualitative probability.
Thus in addition to it being a weak order on B:
(a) ∀E ∈B,E Θw ∅. Moreover [0,1]Θw ∅.
(b) ∀E,F,G∈B with E ∩G= ∅= F ∩G: E Θw F ⇐⇒E ∪GΘw F ∪G.
Axiom PSW5 [Qualities: AR, AMe]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , Θw on Qw ∪B obeys:
(a) Θw ∼Θw [0,1].
(b) ∀R,S ∈Qw and ∀E,F ∈B with R∩S = ∅=E ∩F :
(RΘw E,S Θw F )⇒R∪S Θw E ∪F .
(E Θw R,F Θw S)⇒E ∪F Θw R∪S.
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The next axiom effectively assumes that there is a piR, ∀R ∈Qw, such that the mdm holds
R ∼Θw [0, piR]. It is encoded in terms of closed sets, however, to capture the iterative,
bounding process of elicitation commonly used to assess piR, which becomes, of course, her
subjective probability of R.
Axiom PSW6 [Qualities: AMe, AMa]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∀R ∈Qw, both:
{pi ∈ [0,1] | [0, pi]Θw R} and {pi ∈ [0,1] |RΘw [0, pi]}
are closed.
Axioms PSW1 to PSW6 are enough to ensure that the resulting probabilities are finitely
additive. Axiom PSW7 provides the necessary extension to ensure countable additivity.
Axiom PSW7 [Qualities: AMa]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , if R1 ⊇R2 ⊇R3 ⊇ · · · is a decreasing sequence of events in Qw
such that Ri Θw [0, pi], ∀i for some fixed pi ∈ [0,1],
⋂∞
i=1Ri Θw [0, pi].
Central to the Bayesian approach is the use of Bayes Theorem to prescribe how the mdm
should update her beliefs in the light of observed data. To do this there is a need to be able
to construct and manipulate conditional probabilities coherently. For any R,S,T ∈Qw for
which the mdm holds T Θw ∅, we define (R | T )Θw (S | T ) if she holds R to be at least
as likely as S when she knows that T has occurred.
Axiom PSW8 [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∀R,S,T ∈Qw with T Θw ∅:
(R | T )Θw (S | T )⇐⇒R∩T Θw S ∩T .
Axioms PSW1—PSW8 allow that a subjective probability representation of Θw may be
constructed on each small world {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw ,Cw},w= 1,2, . . . ,W .
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Lemma 1
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W :
(a) if Qw is a field, then under Axioms PSW1—PSW6 there is a unique, finitely additive
probability distribution PΘw on Θw agreeing with Θw in the sense that ∀R,S ∈Qw,
RΘw S⇐⇒ PΘw(R)≥ PΘw(S);
(b) if Qw is a σ-field, then under Axioms PSW1—PSW7 there is a unique, countably
additive probability distribution PΘw on Θw agreeing with Θw in the sense that ∀R,S ∈Qw,
RΘw S⇐⇒ PΘw(R)≥ PΘw(S);
(c) if, in addition, Axiom PSW8 holds, then ∀R,S,T ∈Qw for which T Θw ∅,
(R | T )Θw (S | T )⇐⇒ PΘw(R | T )≥ PΘw(S | T ).
Proof: See Appendix.
We can now move onto to the axioms that underpin the utility part of seu theory.
Initially, we state a set of axioms that allow the utility function to be constructed for
the case that Cw is finite; or, if Cw is conceptually infinite, then the set {c ∈ Cw | c =
a(θ) for some a∈Aw and θ ∈Θw} is finite. First we need assume that the mdm is prepared
to compare any two consequences in Cw and do so in a transitive way.
Axiom PSW9 [Qualities: AR, AC ]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , Cw is a weak order on Cw.
The elicitation process, i.e. the measurement process, used to assess utilities very often
asks for comparisons between possible consequences and hypothetical bets based on the
randomising device that involving a finite number of consequences. For this reason we
introduce PSw, the set of simple distributions over Cw, i.e. distributions that give positive
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probability to a finite number of elements of Cw. We identify each simple distribution
p ∈ PSw with a bet that gives prizes (consequences) c ∈Cw according to the probabilities
p. We shall assume that the mdm is prepared to make comparisons between any c ∈ Cw
and any p∈PSw, extending Cw to Sw as:
Axiom PSW10 [Qualities: AR, AMe]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , the relation Sw extends Cw such that:
(a) Sw is a weak order on C ∪PSw;
(b) Sw restricted to Cw is identical to Cw ;
(c) For each c∈Cw, let Ψc ∈PSw be the degenerate distribution which gives
probability 1 to c. Then c1 Cw c2⇐⇒Ψc1 Sw Ψc2.
Denote by c1αc2 with c1, c2 ∈Cw and 0≤ α≤ 1 the simple distribution which gives prob-
ability α to c1 and probability (1−α) to c2. By definition, c1αc2 ∈ PSw. The next axiom
assumes that for any pair of such bets with the same two consequences the mdm prefers
the bet with the higher probability of gaining the better prize.
Axiom PSW11 [Qualities: AR, AMe]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∀c1, c2 ∈Cw with c1 Cw c2, c1αc2 Sw c1α′c2⇐⇒ α>α′
We also make the assumption that Cw is bounded
5 in the sense that there is a best and
worst consequence in Cw.
Axiom PSW12 [Qualities: AC ]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∃c∗w, cw∗ ∈Cw such that c∗w Sw cw∗ and ∀c∈Cw,
c∗w Sw cSw cw∗.
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In the same way that Axiom PSW6 essentially assumed that the mdm could identify a
simple event in the reference experiment which she perceived as equally likely to each
event in Qw so Axiom PSW13 essentially assumes that for each c ∈ Cw she can identify
a simple gamble between c∗w and cw∗ based on the reference experiment that she holds to
be of equal value to it: ∃α ∈ [0,1] such that c∼Cw cw∗αc∗w. Again, however, this is stated
more generally in terms of closed sets to capture the commonly used process that is used
in elicitation to bracket the utility of c.
Axiom PSW13 [Qualities: AMe, AMa]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∀c1, c2, c3 ∈Cw such that c1 Cw c2 Cw c3, with at least one strict
preference:
{α∈ [0,1] | c1αc3 Sw c2} and {α∈ [0,1] | c2 Sw c1αc3}
are both closed.
The next two axioms assume that for any simple distribution over Cw the mdm
can construct a gamble of the form c1αc2 which she considers of equal value. Let
〈pi1, b1;pi2, b2; . . . ;pir, br〉 ∈ PSw be the simple distribution which leads to bi ∈C ∪PSw with
probability pii,
∑
i pii = 1. Note that the outcomes involved may differ from distribution
to distribution, but for convenience of notation we assume that b1, b2, . . . , br are common
in any comparisons of different distributions: i.e. that outcomes with probability zero are
introduced to align the two distributions in the obvious manner. Note also that by allowing
that an outcome may lie in PSw, we are introducing compound gambles into the model,
i.e. gambles in which one or more prizes might be entries into further gambles in PSw.
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Axiom PSW14, known as Substitutability, assumes that the mdm is indifferent between
two distributions if one outcome is substituted by another for which she is indifferent.
Axiom PSW14 [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , let b, b′ ∈Cw ∪PSw, b∼Sw b′. Let p= 〈. . . ;pi, b; . . .〉 ∈ PSw lead to b with
probability pi, and let p′ = 〈. . . ;pi, b′; . . .〉 ∈ PSw differ from p only in that b′ has been
substituted for b. Then:
〈. . . ;pi, b; . . .〉 ∼Sw 〈. . . ;pi, b′; . . .〉.
Axiom PSW15 is a requirement that the mdm’s preferences over PSw are independent of
the number of randomisations involved in generating the ultimate probabilities of outcomes
in Cw. It is known as the Reduction of Compound Lotteries.
Axiom PSW15 [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , consider the mixture of simple distributions 〈pi1, p1;pi2, p2; . . . ;pis, ps; 〉,
where pi = 〈pii1, c1;pii2, c2; . . . ;piir, cr; 〉 ∈ PSw. Let ρj =
∑s
i=1 piipiij for j = 1,2, . . . , r. Then:
〈pi1, p1;pi2, p2; . . . ;pis, ps; 〉 ∼Sw 〈ρ1, c1;ρ2, c2; . . . ;ρr, cr; 〉.
Axioms PSW1—PSW15 provide the basis for the construction of the seu representation
of the mdm’s preferences over PSw.
Lemma 2
In the presence of Axioms PSW1—PSW8, Axioms PSW9—PSW15 imply that ∀w =
1,2, . . . ,W , ∃uw :C→<, an agreeing utility function on Cw such that ∀c, c′ ∈Cw:
cCw c′⇐⇒ uw(c)≥ uw(c′).
Moreover, ∀p, q ∈PSw:
pSw q⇐⇒E(uw(c) | p)≥E(uw(c) | q),
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where the expectations are taken with respect to the distributions p and q respectively. In
addition, uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof: See Appendix.
Remember that, for each small world, distributions in PSw only give positive probability
to a finite set of consequences in Cw. Thus the expected utilities in the second part of
Lemma 2 are finite sums. Shortly we will discuss the more general case of continuous
distributions and integration. First though we remain with the finite case. Note that PSw
is not Aw. To justify using seu theory as a basis for prescriptive analysis, we need to ensure
that the mdm perceives the possible actions in Aw as equivalent to actions in PSw, at least
in so far as helping her construct her preferences over Aw. Define for a∈Aw:
PCw(c
′ | a) =
∑
{θ∈Θw|c′=a(θ)}
PΘw(θ). (5)
which gives the probability that action a ∈ Aw leads to the consequence c′ ∈ Cw. Then
for each a∈Aw define pa ∈PSw as 〈PCw(c1 | a), c1;PCw(c2 | a), c2; . . . ;PCw(cr | a), cr〉, where
{c1, c2, . . . , cr} contains all consequences for which a gives positive probability. We assume
that the mdm perceives that a and pa have the same value to her; or rather that she
prefers a to b if and only if she prefers pa to pb. We introduce the obvious notation Aw
for her preferences on Aw.
Axiom PSW16 [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , suppose that a, b∈Aw are such that both lead only to a finite number
of consequences and let {c1, c2, . . . , cr} ⊂Cw contain these,
i.e. PCw({c1, c2, . . . , cr} | a) = 1 = PCw({c1, c2, . . . , cr} | b). Then:
aAw b⇐⇒ pa Sw pb
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Axiom PSW16 justifies the use of seu to construct the mdm’s preference ranking over Aw
when the actions can lead to at most a finite number of consequences, viz.
aAw b⇐⇒E(uw(c) | pa)≥E(uw(c) | pb) (6)
We interpret E(uw(c) | pa) as the subjective expected utility of a ∈Aw and usually denote
it as simply E(uw(c) | a) or, even more simply, E(uw | a).
The construction implicit in these axioms defines uw(·) uniquely with uw(c∗) = 1 and
uw(c∗) = 0. However any affine transformation of uw(·) will also represent the same pref-
erences since ∀α> 0 and ∀−∞<β <∞:
E(uw(c) | a)≥E(uw(c) | b)⇐⇒E(αuw(c) +β | a)≥E(αuw(c) +β | b) (7)
Moreover, if uw(·) and u′w(·) represent the same preferences then u′w(·) = αuw(·) + β for
some α> 0 and some −∞<β <∞ (DeGroot 1970, French and Rios Insua 2000).
Pulling the threads together gives:
Theorem 1
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W
(a) Axioms PSW1—PSW6, PSW9—PSW16 are sufficient to justify the seu representation
with finitely additive probabilities of the mdm’s preferences over Aw, viz.:
aAw a′⇐⇒E(uw | a)≥E(uw | a′).
where:
E(uw | a) =
∑
θ∈Θw uw(a(θ))PΘw(θ),
uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and PΘw(·) is finitely additive.
(b) If Axiom PSW7 holds, PΘw(·) is countably additive.
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(c) If Axiom PSW8 holds, the use of Bayes Theorem to model the updating of belief in the
light of data is justified.
Proof: See Appendix.
For many practical decision analyses the assumption of finiteness is not a constraint.
The theory is sufficient to justify Bayesian analysis on most decision trees and influence
diagrams. However, for much of statistics and for more complex decision analyses, the
theory needs to be extended to cases in which one or more of the spaces are infinite. It
seems to me that there are two ways forward here. Either way requires us to remember
that none of the small worlds {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw ,Cw} are the real world; each is only a
putative model.
The first – my preferred route, at least conceptually – is to axiomatise a finite seu model
with finite additivity; in doing so, we minimise the influence of axioms with AMa qualities.
Then we approximate the analysis in this finite model by using continuous probability
distribution and utility functions, and use integration to approximate the finite sums that
form the expected utilities. After all in practice in any analysis, we elicit:
• a finite number of properties of any probability distribution and then fit a convenient,
tractable, often standard distributional form; and
• the utilities of a finite number of consequences, perhaps properties such as risk attitude,
and then sketch in or adopt a convenient, tractable utility function.
Moreover, we use computational methods such as mcmc in our analyses which approximate
the ‘correct’ analytic forms. So why pretend that we are approximating a fully axiomat-
ically justified countably additive, infinite small world? Why not simply admit that the
axiomatised seu model is based on a finite small world with finitely additive probabilities?
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The alternative route is, of course, to extend the axiomatisation to justify an infinite
seu model in which probabilities are countably additive and that sufficient measurability
conditions hold for all necessary expectations to exist. This is the route that most of the
Bayesian literature has (implicitly) followed. So we now indicate how this can be done.
Firstly, to avoid restating all the axioms, we redefine PSw as the set of all distributions
over Cw. Since Cw is no longer finite, we specify that all distributions in PSw are taken
to be over the same (σ−)field Dw. Sw is extended similarly to be a relation on the new
C ∪PSw. However, we need to modify the statements, though not the intent, of Axioms
PSW14 and PSW15, since they explicitly refer to specific finite distributions over Cw.
Axiom PSW14′ [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , let b, b′ ∈C ∪PSw, b∼Sw b′. Let p∈PSw be a distribution which leads
to b with probability pi, and let p′ ∈PSw differ from p only in that b′ has been substituted
for b, i.e. p′ gives b′with probability pi and all other consequences with the same
probabilities that b does.
Then p∼Sw p′.
Axiom PSW15′ [Qualities: AR]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , consider the mixture of distributions pi ◦ p in which p∈PSw is selected
to give an outcome b∈Cw ∪PSw according to the probability distribution pi ∈PSw.
Let ρ∈PSw be the distribution with probability density defined by ρ(c) =
∫
PSw p(c)dpi(p).
Then ρ∼Sw pi ◦ p.
Finally, we need to ensure that Qw and Dw are compatible and that ∀a ∈Aw, the utility
function uw(a(·)) is measurable with respect to Qw so that the expectation:
E(uw | a) =
∫
Θw
uw(a(θ))dPΘw(θ) (8)
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is well defined. Thus the axioms which ensure this relate much more to the mathematical
structure of the small world than the rationality that we require of the mdm. Since we
are still assuming through Axiom PSW12 that the consequence space is bounded, the
following axiom is sufficient to ensure that uw(·) is measurable6.
Axiom PSW17 [Qualities: AMa]
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W ,
(a) ∀Q∈Qw and ∀a∈Aw, {a(θ)∈Cw | θ ∈Qw} ∈Dw
(b) ∀x∈ [0,1], {c | x≥ uw(c)} ∈Dw; i.e. uw(·) is measurable with respect to Dw.
These axioms are sufficient to justify the seu representation in each small world.
Theorem 2
∀w = 1,2, . . . ,W , Axioms PSW1—PSW13, PSW14′, PSW15′, PSW16 and PSW17 are
sufficient to justify the seu representation of the mdm’s preferences over Aw, viz.:
aAw a′⇐⇒E(uw | a)≥E(uw | a′).
where:
E(uw | a) =
∫
θ∈Θw uw(a(θ))dPΘw(θ),
uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation, PΘw(·) is countably additive, and
the use of Bayes Theorem to model the updating of belief in the light of data is justified.
Proof: See Appendix.
Two points related to this axiomatisation are worthy of emphasis. First, while this devel-
opment lacks the mathematical beauty and sophistication of Savage’s or DeGroot’s, it does
justify the processes used in the practice of statistical and decision analysis. Particularly
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in the finite case, the axioms directly justify the constructions that we use with our clients
to build subjective probabilities and utilities. In French (1986) and French et al (2009),
we demonstrate these in a much less mathematical way, showing where the assumptions
are brought to bear to justify the elicitation and analysis in a simple example. Second, the
axiomatisation refers to the mdm’s judgements Θw and Cw . In assuming that the mdm
can make consistent judgements of finer and finer discrimination as required by Axioms
PSW6 and PSW13, we are assuming that she is not susceptible to System 1 thinking nor
of bounded cognitive capacity. She is there to provide an idealised metaphor of a decision
maker to help guide the real dm towards a more rational decision than she would otherwise
make. Of course, the actual dm may find the mdm’s entirely explicit System 2 analysis
unconvincing and follow her own judgement, which may be based on System 1 Thinking;
and her choice may in some instances be none the worse for that (Goldstein and Gigerenzer
2002). However, the point is that this axiomatisation has at its heart a recognition of the
practical process of statistical and decision analysis in which System 2 analysis is used to
challenge the dm’s System 1 Thinking to help build her understanding of the issues.
Rather obviously, this axiomatisation of seu for several small worlds contains and hence
justifies seu in a single small world.
It is important to be clear on what comparisons may be represented through the sub-
jective probabilities, utility values and expected utilities that have been developed:
• Within each small world {Θw,Cw,Aw,Θw ,Cw}, w= 1,2, . . . ,W :
—Pw represents the mdm’s beliefs over Θw, i.e.
∀E,F ∈Qw,E Θw F ⇐⇒ PΘw(E)≥ PΘw(E).
In particular, certainties are represented by PΘw(Θw) = 1, since Θw ∼Θ [0,1].
Simon French: Parallel Small Worlds
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2018-05-258 33
—uw(·) represents the mdm’s preferences over Cw, i.e.
∀c, c′ ∈Cw, cCw c′⇐⇒ uw(c)≥ uw(c′).
— Expected utilities represent the mdm’s preferences over Aw, i.e.
∀a,a′ ∈Aw, aAw a′⇐⇒E(uw | a)≥E(uw | a′).
• It should be remembered that the mdm may represent quite different belief and prefer-
ences within each small world. This may because the mdm has different knowledge and
evidence in different scenarios or because she represents different dms or stakeholders.
We have not introduced into the notation a conditioning history H such as used by
Jeffreys (1961) and other writers; but if we had, it would represent not just the mdm’s
entire experience, but also her culture, world view, etc. – and it would condition her
utilities as well as her probabilities. This implies that we allow that Θw might be condi-
tioned on counterfactual information. Note also that in allowing that the mdm’s beliefs
and preferences may be quite different in each small world, we are breaking away from
any idea that the small worlds need be nested in a single grand world. The framework
of multiple small worlds allows us to justify not only scenario-focused decision analyses,
but also analyses such as in Rothlisberger et al (2012) in which one considers worlds in
which some past event did not happen.
• Between small worlds the mdm beliefs exhibit some comparability in the sense that
she believes an event in one small world to be equally likely to an event in another
if E ∈ Qw1 , F ∈ Qw2 and G ∈ B are such that E ∼Θw1 G and F ∼Θw2 G. Similarly, by
comparisons through the common reference experiment she can assess whether one event
in one small world is more likely that another event in another small world or not. But
again remember that her probabilities will almost certainly be conditioned on different
evidence and experience in the different small worlds.
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• Without further assumptions, however, preferences are not comparable across small
worlds, because each uw(·) is only unique up to different affine transformations. This, of
course, has the implication that any idea of using maximin-like ideas to select strategies
that are least bad across the small worlds would lay the analysis open to spurious choices
of scale.
5. Nuclear sustainability: further discussion
To give some substance to the discussion, we return to the nuclear sustainability example
of Section 2. French et al (2011) describe a realistic, but hypothetical sfda of this prob-
lem. Because the impact of nuclear generation depends on other generation in the energy
portfolio, strategies included planned changes in the use of gas, coal and renewables. Thus
a strategy was a specification of energy policy as foreseen for the period 2010-2060. Thus
the analysis took different energy portfolios and projected various costs and impacts arising
between 2010 and 2060. Key uncertainties included:
• whether a hydrogen economy would develop within a useful timeframe;
• whether carbon capture and storage would become economic in the near future;
• the completion of a connector to the European Supergrid;
• the future regulation of nuclear power;
• the possibility of a major nuclear accident in the world changing public acceptance of
nuclear power significantly;
• the development of the UK economy.
A wide range of scenarios were considered. Table 1 summarises the results for six, three
relating to different economic contexts and three to different regulation regimes. In the
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latter case, we looked to cultural theory as a guide to different risk attitudes (Douglas
1992) in building each of the three scenarios. [N.b. ‘current’ relates to the late 2000s.]
• Base Case: current planning and regulatory frameworks; economic growth in line with
rest of world.
• Hierarchist: stringent regulation, but faster planning and low probability of abandoning
nuclear in event of accident.
• Entrepreneurial: lower regulation, faster planning cycles, less surplus capacity, more
likely to abandon nuclear in event of accident.
• Egalitarian: stringent and slower regulation and planning, extremely likely to abandon
nuclear in the event of an accident.
• UK Economic Decline: UK performs poorly relative to the rest of the world; other
factors as in the Base Case.
• UK Economic Growth: UK performs well relative to the rest of the world; other
factors as in the Base Case.
Four energy policies are presented in Table 1. N.b. coal needed to be phased out in all
scenarios because of international commitments.
• Status quo: the UK’s current planning for building new nuclear plants and managing
the rest of the energy portfolio.
• No new nuclear: abandon plans for new nuclear generation and increase gas and
renewables.
• Reduce gas: reduce generation by gas, increase nuclear and renewables.
• Go it alone: abandon planned link with European Supergrid and increase renewables.
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Energy Policy
Base Case Hierachist Entrepreneurial Egalitarian
UK Economic
Decline
UK Economic
Growth
Industry Consumer Industry Consumer Industry Consumer Industry Consumer Industry Consumer Industry Consumer
Status
quo
Rank 3 3 3 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 3
Exp
Loss
1526 270 1419 209 2058 186 1427 241 1010 191 2309 245
No new
nuclear
Rank 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
Exp
Loss
1445 256 1395 203 2147 195 1363 231 948 179 2269 240
Reduce
gas
Rank 4 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 4
Exp
Loss
1572 271 1431 208 2141 192 1378 235 982 185 2326 246
Go it
alone
Rank 2 2 2 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 2
Exp
Loss
1524 269 1416 208 2054 186 1407 239 1006 190 2279 243
Table 1: Possible output from sfda of nuclear sustainability
Because we were dealing mainly with costs, we worked in expected loss, the negative
of expected utility. These were discounted over time and considered for two stakeholder
groups: the power industry and consumers. Note again that these were hypothetical studies;
probability and value judgements were made by the project team in line with each scenario
and stakeholder group.
For each energy policy under each scenario, Table 1 provides the expected losses to the
industry and consumer groups. The ranking of the policies within each scenario is also
given. Note that the industry and consumer losses are measured on very different scales
because they are impacted by different costs.
Unfortunately, the project funding completed before we had the opportunity to explore
our different scenario-focused decision analyses with senior members of the nuclear com-
munity and government agencies who were shaping the UK energy policy at the time. So
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neither could we tailor the value judgements to reflect the preferences of actual stakehold-
ers nor were questions about the transparency and usefulness of the information addressed.
Nevertheless, this example analysis is sufficient to give body to our discussion. So to return
to the general remarks made at the end of the previous section.
Probabilities are comparable across scenarios, but utilities are not. This clearly has
implications for the interpretation of the results of scenario-focused analyses. They pro-
vide the dm with guidance on the ranking of actions within each scenario, but there is
no guidance on how she should compare actions across scenarios. Thus in Table 1, it is
appropriate to compare the expected losses down the columns, but not across the rows7;
rankings are provided within columns.
The analysis provides no guidance on how to rank the actions overall. The motivation of
sfda is that, by exploring the pros and cons of different actions in each scenario, the dm
will see the issues before her more clearly and be able to make a better decision. Here an
energy policy with no new nuclear build ranks highest for both consumers and industry in
all scenarios except the Entrepreneurial. She might note that reduced regulation as in the
Entrepreneurial scenario is extremely unlikely, and so feel that abandoning nuclear energy
is the best overall. However, she should remember that the six scenarios are a very partial,
possibly unbalanced sampling of all possible futures.
6. Further discussion of SFDA
Stewart et al (2013) explore whether some form of weighted aggregation might be made
across the scenarios, noting that the weights can represent neither uncertainties nor pref-
erences. Weights cannot represent uncertainties because the scenarios neither span all
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possible futures nor are disjoint. Weights cannot represent preferences, at least in the sense
that preferences are modelled by utilities, because the dm cannot choose to resolve uncer-
tainties as ranking scenarios would imply. Stewart et al suggest that some notion of the
relative importance of the scenarios to the dm might provide a meaningful interpretation of
weights that would allow aggregation across scenarios. But the meaning of relative impor-
tance is a nebulous one, presumably relating to the motivation for selecting the scenarios
that are included in the analysis. The selection of scenarios is currently being researched
in several contexts8. Moreover, such an approach would require expected utilities in the
scenarios assessed on the same scale, a condition that we have noted is not generally true.
It is possible to imagine circumstances in which a common utility scale across scenarios
might be constructed. Suppose that there are two consequences which are common to all
scenarios. Suppose that each is such that the mdm is indifferent to receiving it whether it
is received in one scenario or another and that she consistently prefers one consequence to
the other. Then such a pair of consequences would allow the utility functions to be aligned
through affine transformations. In some contexts, e.g. if the consequences are essentially
monetary, this it might be the case. In the example, the consequences to nuclear industry
are mainly monetary so their expected losses might be comparable across scenarios. But
this is less likely to be the case for consumers for whom, e.g., unreliable supply would have
lifestyle consequences.
An alternative approach requiring complex elicitation might be to use a swing-weighting
approach (French et al 2009, Keeney and Raiffa 1976) to assess the relative importance
of scenarios and bring the utility functions to the same scale simultaneously. Note that
any perception of value needs to be made by the same dm, otherwise there will be need to
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justify interpersonal comparison of preferences (French 1986, French and Argyris 2018).
Thus if scenarios are used to represent different stakeholder perceptions, the mdm would
a supra-decision-maker (Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
Notwithstanding these suggestions, we should remember that sfda has been developed
to deal with circumstances in which there are deep uncertainties, which bring a potential
for catastrophic or paradigmatic changes in beliefs or preferences, or significantly different
stakeholder perspectives (French et al 1997). Thus it is unlikely that the analyses will be
fully commensurate across scenarios.
Introducing Bayesian modelling into the scenarios brings with it some conceptual dif-
ficulties. There will be many scenarios which describes worlds very far from reality and
Savage’s grand world. Thus Savage’s and other earlier axiomatisations of the Bayesian
seu model may not cohere with scenario-focused thinking. In fact there are echoes of the
motivation behind the development of subjective probabilities conditioned on counterfac-
tuals and causal decision decision theory (Gibbard and Harper 1988, Meek and Glymour
1994, Pearl 2009), but note that the ‘what if’ or ‘counterfactual’ conditioning implicit in
scenario-focused thinking is much more informal than those much more theoretical devel-
opments. Indeed, they and some related developments in the literature on causality make
strong implicit assumptions that the small world relates closely to the real world.
The axiom system presented in section 4 provides a justification for using the Bayesian
model in sfda. In each scenario, i.e. each small world, the mdm is constructed to represent
an ’interesting’ set of beliefs and preferences given the history and culture of and the
knowledge available to the decision maker in that hypothetical context. Note again that the
real dm might wish to think herself (altruistically) into the position of other stakeholders,
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so we refer to ‘interesting’ judgements rather than simply her own. If she is convinced by
the rationality that is built into the Bayesian seu model, she will need to accept those
axioms with the Arationailty quality. Moreover, the need to elicit and manipulate subjective
probabilities and utilities means she must also accept those axioms with AMe and AMa
qualities. Thus the acceptability of the axiom system as a justification of sfda depends
primarily on the acceptability of those axioms with the AC quality: viz. Axioms PSW1,
PSW3, PSW9 and PSW12. The context issues in these relate to:
• The elements in the each small world Θw,Cw,Aw,w = 1,2, . . . ,W are sufficiently well
defined and understood for the mdm — and therefore also the real dm — to express
her beliefs and preferences over them as weak orders. We are assuming that it is not
necessary for the states, consequences and actions to be representations of the real world
for the dm to be able to make the required judgements: she can think hypothetically
and possibly counterfactually.
• The rather obvious demand that the ‘certain’ event is strictly more likely than the null
event and the more constraining condition that there exists c∗w and cw∗ which bound the
set of consequences.
These are hardly more demanding conceptually than when there is a single small world.
Thus the key questions in justifying sfda in any particular case relate to whether the
real dm can think herself well enough into each scenario for Θw and Sw to be elicited.
That is more a question for empirical behavioural studies than theoretical discussion of
the acceptability of the axioms.
There are many further issues to be addressed and resolved before sfda is fully estab-
lished and justified as a sound method of supporting decision-making. These relate partic-
ularly to the judgements required of the dm during elicitation and the transparency and
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acceptability of the process of sfda to her. We will not explore these in any depth here,
but note the following need for research.
• Cognitive studies are needed into the elicitation of subjective probabilities and utilities
within scenarios. How should questions be asked of the dm that satisfactorily condi-
tion her responses on each scenario? This may be particularly difficult when a scenario
assumes counterfactuals.
• How should the results of the analysis be presented to the dm? Simply providing an
seu ranking within each scenario as offered in Table 1 is clearly not sufficient. Away
from scenarios, current decision analysis uses sensitivity analysis and other tools to build
qualitative understanding and articulate discussion (French 2003). How should these
processes be extended to sfda in a meaningful and transparent fashion?
• Indeed, will dms find the results of an sfda transparent and useful? Comparing the two
case studies in Montibeller et al (2006) suggests that this is not a foregone conclusion.
• We have not discussed the development of appropriate scenarios within sfda. There is
an extensive literature on constructing scenarios for qualitative scenario analysis (Schoe-
maker 1995, Mahmoud et al 2009); but sfda may require a modified approach.
7. Conclusion
In this paper I have explored the theoretical underpinning of sfda, arguing that current
axiomatisations of seu require extending to deal with two issues:
1. the need to introduce the same reference experiment into all scenarios to ensure con-
sistency between the analyses within scenarios;
2. the lack of nesting of scenarios, the possibility that some may contain counterfactual
assumptions, and that some may not be an approximation to a true grand world.
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Section 4 shows that, at the cost of some loss of mathematical elegance, axiomatisations of
the seu model can be developed which identify the reference experiment quite separately
from the underlying small world(s) and that this can be done in a constructive fashion
which mimics and thus directly justifies the processes of decision analysis. Moreover, the
approach extends the seu model naturally to the case of sfda. While the development has
paid considerable attention to the practice of decision analysis, there are many cognitive
issues that need addressing by behavioural studies. Some of these are listed at the end of
the previous section.
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Appendix. Outline Proofs
Lemma 1
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W :
(a) if Qw is a field, then under Axioms PSW1—PSW6 there is a unique, finitely additive
probability distribution PΘw on Θw agreeing with Θw in the sense that ∀R,S ∈Qw,
RΘw S⇐⇒ PΘw(R)≥ PΘw(S);
(b) if Qw is a σ-field, then under Axioms PSW1—PSW7 there is a unique, countably
additive probability distribution PΘw on Θw agreeing with Θw in the sense that ∀R,S ∈Qw,
RΘw S⇐⇒ PΘw(R)≥ PΘw(S);
(c) if, in addition, Axiom PSW8 holds, then ∀R,S,T ∈Qw for which T Θw ∅,
(R | T )Θw (S | T )⇐⇒ PΘw(R | T )≥ PΘw(S | T ).
Proof (outline):
(a) For any w = 1,3, . . . ,W : consider R ∈ Qw. Then, by PSW1, PSW3, PSW4 and
PSW5(a):
1∈ {pi ∈ [0,1] | [0, pi]Θw R}=H, say; (9)
0∈ {pi ∈ [0,1] |RΘw [0, pi]}=K, say. (10)
PSW1 ensures that Θw is complete, so H ∪K = [0,1]. Using the connectedness of [0,1]
and the closure of H and K given by PSW6 gives H ∩K 6= ∅. Hence ∃piR ∈ [0,1] such that
R∼Θw [0, piR]. By PSW1 and PSW2, piR is unique.
Define PΘw(R) = piR, ∀R ∈Qw. Clearly PΘw(R)≥ 0. By PSW5(a), PΘw(Θw) = 1.
Next let R,S ∈Qw be such that R⊂ S. Then S =R∪ (Rc ∩S) and R∩ (Rc ∩S) = ∅. We
have (Rc ∩S)Θw ∅. So, by PSW5:
S =R∪ (Rc ∩S)Θw R∪∅=R. (11)
So R⊂ S =⇒ S θw R, which implies PΘw(S)≥ PΘw(R).
Next we show that PΘw(·) is additive. Let R,S ∈Qw be such that R∩S = ∅. Then R∼Θw
[0, PΘw(R)] and R ∪ S ∼Θw [0, PΘw(R ∪ S)]. Additivity will follow if we can show that
S ∼Θw (PΘw(R), PΘw(R ∪ S)]. If S Θw (PΘw(R), PΘw(R ∪ S)], then using the implication
of PSW5 for strictly more likely, Θw :
R∪S Θw [0, PΘw(R)]∪ (PΘw(R), PΘw(R∪S)] = [0, PΘw(R∪S)] (12)
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which is untrue. A similar contradiction follows if S ≺Θw (PΘw(R), PΘw(R∪S)]. So S ∼Θw
(PΘw(R), PΘw(R ∪ S)]; and [0, PΘw(S)] ∼Θw (PΘw(R), PΘw(R ∪ S)]. Hence PΘw(R ∪ S) =
PΘw(R) +PΘw(S).
Simple induction gives for Ri ∈Qw, i= 1,2, . . . , n with Ri ∩Rj = ∅ for i 6= j:
PΘw(
n⋃
i=1
Ri) =
n∑
i=1
PΘw(Ri) (13)
Thus PΘw(·) is a finitely additive probability distribution on Θw.
Let R,S ∈Qw be such that RΘw S. Then:
[0, PΘw(R))∼Θw RΘw S ∼Θw [0, PΘw(S)] (14)
So, by PSW2 PΘw(R)≥ PΘw(S). Hence PΘw(·) agrees with  Θw on Θw.
(b) Suppose now that Qw and B are σ-fields. Let Ri ∈ Qw for i= 1,2,3, . . . be such that
R1 ⊇R2 ⊇R3 ⊇ . . . and
⋂∞
i=1 = ∅. Since Θw is a qualitative probability and since PΘw(·)
agrees with it, PΘw(R1)≥ PΘw(R2)≥ PΘw(R3)≥ . . .≥ 0. It follows that limi→∞PΘw exists.
Suppose that this limit is strictly positive, λ> 0 say. Then ∀i, PΘw(Ri)>λ. So ∀i, Ri Θw
[0, λ]Θw ∅. Hence, by PSW7,
⋂∞
i=1Ri Θw ∅, which is a contradiction. So limi→∞PΘw = 0,
which implies that PΘw(·) is countably additive.
(c) The condition T Θw ∅ in PSW8 together with the results in part (a) ensure that
PΘw(T )> 0. So PΘw(R | T ) and PΘw(S | T ) exist. Moreover,
PΘw(R | T )≥ PΘw(S | T )⇐⇒ PΘw(R∩T )≥ PΘw(S ∩T ). (15)
Hence the result follows immediately from PSW8 and the the fact that PΘw(·) agrees with
Θw .
Lemma 2 In the presence of Axioms PSW1—PSW8, Axioms PSW9—PSW15 imply
that ∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W , ∃uw :C→<, an agreeing utility function on Cw such that ∀c, c′ ∈Cw:
cCw c′⇐⇒ uw(c)≥ uw(c′).
Moreover, ∀p, q ∈PSw:
pSw q⇐⇒E(uw(c) | p)≥E(uw(c) | q),
where the expectations are taken with respect to the distributions p and q respectively. In
addition, uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
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Proof (outline):
In the following we shall adopt the convention that for any w= 1,2, . . . ,W , all p∈PSw may
be structured so that p= 〈pi1, c1;pi2, c2; . . . ;pir, cr〉 with c1 = c∗w Sw c2 Sw c3 Sw . . .Sw
cr = cw∗. In other words, the consequences of any simple distribution are ordered from
best to worst. Moreover, we assume that c∗w and cw∗ are included in the consequences,
though, of course, that may be with zero probabilities. Again, we will assume that the
pii are zero as necessary to allow a common indexing of consequences when comparing
different distributions. Since we shall only compare a finite number of distributions, this
will not affect the overall finite number of consequences in our argument.
For each w = 1,2, . . . ,W , we argue from PSW9 – PSW13, analogously to the proof of
part (a) of Lemma 3, that ∀c ∈ Cw, there exists a unique α such that c ∼Sw c∗wαcw∗.
Let p= 〈pi1, c1;pi2, c2; . . . ;pir, cr〉 ∈ PSw. Let ci ∼Sw c∗wαicw∗, for i= 1,2, . . . , r. Note that by
PSW10(c), c∗w ∼Sw c∗w1cw∗ and cw∗ ∼Sw c∗w0cw∗. Next for i= 1,2, . . . , r, use axioms PSW14
and PSW15 to substitute c∗wαicw∗ for ci, in turn, to deduce:
p= 〈pi1, c1;pi2, c2; . . . ;pir, cr〉 ∼Sw c∗w
(
r∑
i=1
piiαi
)
cw∗. (16)
Similarly, given q = 〈τ1, c1; τ2, c2; . . . ; τr, cr〉, it follows that q ∼Sw c∗w (
∑r
i=1 τiαi) cw∗. Hence
by PSW11:
pSw q⇐⇒
(
r∑
i=1
piiαi
)
≥
(
r∑
i=1
τiαi
)
. (17)
Setting u(ci) = αi gives the seu representation.
Although this constructive proof defines u(c) uniquely for each c∈Cw, the linearity of the
expectation operator means that it is only unique up to an affine transformation.
Theorem 1
∀w= 1,2, . . . ,W
(a) Axioms PSW1—PSW6, PSW9—PSW16 are sufficient to justify the seu representation
with finitely additive probabilities of the mdm’s preferences over Aw, viz.:
aAw a′⇐⇒E(uw | a)≥E(uw | a′).
where:
E(uw | a) =
∑
θ∈Θw uw(a(θ))PΘw(θ),
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uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and PΘw(·) is finitely additive.
(b) If Axiom PSW7 holds, PΘw(·) is countably additive.
(c) If Axiom PSW8 holds, the use of Bayes Theorem to model the updating of belief in the
light of data is justified.
Proof (outline):
Noting from (5) that:
E(uw | a) =
∑
θ∈Θw
uw(a(θ))PΘw(θ) =
∑
c∈Cw
uw(c)
∑
{θ|c=a(θ)}
PΘ(θ) (18)
Lemmas 3 and 4 together with Axiom PSW16 immediately yield part (a).
Parts (b) and (c) are restatements of parts (b) and (c) of Lemma 3.
Theorem 2
∀w = 1,2, . . . ,W , Axioms PSW1—PSW13, PSW14′, PSW15′, PSW16 and PSW17 are
sufficient to justify the seu representation of the mdm’s preferences over Aw, viz.:
aAw a′⇐⇒E(uw | a)≥E(uw | a′).
where:
E(uw | a) =
∑
θ∈Θw uw(a(θ))PΘw(θ),
uw(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation, PΘw(·) is countably additive, and
the use of Bayes Theorem to model the updating of belief in the light of data is justified.
Proof (outline):
As before but using Axioms PSW14′, PSW15′ , for each w= 1,2, . . . ,W , define uw(c)∈
[0,1] by c ∼Sw c∗w(uw(c))cw∗. Note that this means that uw(c), c ∈ Cw corresponds to a
probability distribution which gives c∗w with probability uw(c) and cw∗ with probability
(1−uw(c)) and zero probability to the rest of C. By PSW17, uw(c) is a measurable function
with respect to the σ−field Dw and, for any a∈Aw, PΘw(a(·)) is a probability distribution
over Cw also compatible with its σ−field Dw. So E(uw | a) =
∫
Θw
uw(a(θ))dPΘw(θ) exists.
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The argument now proceeds as before, from a∈Aw construct pa ∈PSw such that c∈C
is received with probability
∫
{θ∈Θw|c=a(θ)} dPΘw(θ). Next uw ◦ pa gives c∗w with probability
E(uw | a), cw∗ with probability 1−E(uw | a), while the rest of C has zero probability. So,
by PSW15′, pa Sw pb iff and only if E(uw | a)≥E(uw | b). A simple application of PSW16
now gives the main result. The uniqueness of uw(·) up to a positive affine transformation
and the countable additivity of PΘw follow from the earlier results.
Endnotes
1. Note that here and elsewhere where I refer to the constructive nature of Bayesian
decision analysis and the related nature of the textitconstructive mathematical proofs
that I use, I am not referring specifically to any psychological or educational theory of
Constructivism, though there are clear parallels.
2. We shall adopt the convention of referring to the dm as feminine and the analyst as
male, thus creating greater clarity in the presentation. Note also that there is a subtlety
here. We have moved from discussing dms in the plural to the singular. The Bayesian
model is a model of individual rationality. Extending it to a mathematical structure that
applies to groups is fraught with difficulty. Rather one implements it in processes which
help groups move toward consensus: see, e.g, French et al (2009).
3. Elsewhere, I have used model decision problem (mdp) in the same sense as Savage’s
small world.
4. Although we allow that each small world may represent the perspectives of different
stakeholders, we imagine that the analysis is conducted for one real dm. The Bayesian seu
model is an individualistic one. Developing the processes which support groups of decision
makers is covered elsewhere (French et al 2009). We assume that the dm constructs the
small worlds altruistically to represent other stakeholder perspectives where necessary.
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5. Unbounded theories of utility may be developed along the lines in DeGroot (1970),
although we shall not do so here. In the vast majority of practical cases, the context bounds
the problem in the sense here.
6. For the unbounded case, an axiom with the structure of Assumption U3 in DeGroot
(1970) may be used.
7. We might also note that it is not appropriate to compare expected losses between
industry and consumers; but that arises because of issues with interpersonal comparisons
of preference not the development within this paper (French and Argyris 2018).
8. see, e.g, https://portal.iket.kit.edu/CONFIDENCE/index.php
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